n the first years of the redemocratization of the country, the extrapartisan components of the Brazilian political system were identified as being primarily responsible for the problems of the new democratic governments to sustain an agenda consistent with the economic, political and social reforms.
Social heterogeneity, federalism and the power of the governors would be the main variables to explain the chronic instability of the "coalition presidentialism" (ABRANCHES, 1988) .
Nevertheless, judging by recent scientific production, even though the term 'coalition presidentialism' is still broadly used, including areas outside of academic circles, its relation to the original form has been vague; especially, regarding the need for forming extra-partisan coalitions in the organization of the government. Limongi (2006) observes that, even though from the descriptive point of view the political system may be defined as a coalition presidentilism, the thesis that the parties are incapable of structuring the necessary coalitions to sustain government policies is weak. The 'Gordian Knot' of coalition presidentialism would have been cut by the constitution of 1988.
Contrary to what occurred in the Magna Carta of 1946, the Constitution of 1988 gave the President of the Republic the necessary instruments to govern through the majority party. These are not ad hoc negotiations with representatives of extra-partisan interests in the legislature, which support the political agenda of the executive in the national congress, but rather a coalition of the ruling parties.
The concentration of legislative prerogatives in the executive branch made the partisan activity of the governing base to be the best strategy for representatives to influence the legislative process. Contrary to what happened in the period from [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] , when representatives counted individually on institutional resources to favor their clientels, in the post-constituent (1988) , "the collaboration with parliamentary parties is the best strategy for representatives to strengthen their bargaining power with the Chief Executive" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 246) 1 . 1 In the same line of argument, Limongi (2006) states that, in this new institutional political context, there remains little chance for the minorities to influence the formulation I Sidney Jard da Silva (2016) 10 (2) e0002 -3/27
This new institutional political scenario places an interesting issue before us regarding union participation in social security reform: in situations in which unionist representatives support the ruling party, does the union bloc tend to defend the specific interests of its representative base or to follow the guidance of the partisan coalition of which it is part?
The The aim of this study is to investigate how the bloc of unionist representatives behaves when it is part of a partisan political coalition that proposes measures contrary to the interests of an important sector of its electoral base: specifically, those active and inactive public servants of the federal goverment, states and municipalities.
Following this brief introduction, the study is divided into four sections.
First, the legislative commissions are identified as the privileged locus for union action in the decision-making process of social security reform. Second, the nature of the social security reform introduced by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government is discussed. Third, union participation in the decision-making process of social security reform is analyzed. Finally, the substantive conclusions of the article are summarized.
The main findings of this study confirm that unionism is still an important actor in the process of change of public policies, especially in social security reforms (BÉLAND, 2001) 3 . However, it is also shown that union demands are not expressed directly in the legislative debate on social security reform. Much to the contrary, a detachment between the interests of the union entities and the behavior of the unionist representatives is shown. In an institutional political of public policies, "to be part of the governing coalition or to elect the next President of the Republic" (LIMONGI, 2006, p. 41 Santana and Braga (2009) and Ferraz (2014) .
scenario in which party discipline predominates, unionist representatives and senators tend to follow the guidance of the party, even under pressures to the contrary from their electoral base.
The locus of the union minority
In institutional political contexts in which the President of the Republic concentrates legislative prerogatives, there is relative consensus in the literature affirming that the improvement of the work of the commissions is one of the ways in which the legislative branch is strengthened, facing the executive branch (GOMES, 2006; SANTOS, 2002) .
The decentralization of the legislative process has, as one of its main objectives, endowing the decision-making process with greater functionality and dynamism. Furthermore, it seeks to offer responses to the multiplicity of topics and issues faced within the political system. From the organizational point of view, the legislative commissions contribute to the solution of coordination issues and to the endowment of greater stability and predictability of the process of framing public policies (ROCHA and BARBOSA, 2008; SANTOS and ALMEIDA, 2011) .
From the political point of view, the decentralization of the decisionmaking process allows the minorities to increase their influence in the legislative branch (RICCI and LEMOS, 2004) . Participation in commissions constitutes one of the most efficient strategies for minority groups to influence the political game, their main asset being the power to postpone or block the legislative process in matters to be discussed on the floor of the House.
In the case of Brazil, the composition of parliamentary commissions is formally defined by the President of the House. However, in practice, it is the party leaders who centralize the choice of the representatives and select the names for the President 4 . Thus, the decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of the President of the House and the party leaders. Individually, the representatives have little ability to influence what will be voted on, how it will be voted on, and when it will be voted on. e0002 -5/27 Santos (2002) observes that two basic criteria are considered in the composition of the commissions: 1) party loyalty and 2) expertise. Party loyalty is related to the expectation that, within the commission, the representative will behave according to the guidance of the party in relation to the topic under consideration. Expertise is related to the quality of the information contained in the projects analyzed by the commissions, which may be better evaluated by representatives who act directly or indirectly in the area under consideration.
Thus, the political concerns with loyalty are balanced by the specialized knowledge of the policies considered 5 .
In post-1988 Brazil, the majority have had various instruments to overcome possible political-institutional obstacles represented by the commissions. In the Brazilian institutional arrangement, the minority has no way to prevent matters contrary to its interests from being considered and voted on directly in the House. In other words, the system of commissions was not designed to veto (DINIZ, 1999; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2001; PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2000) .
Nevertheless, the minority may use the few institutional channels available to them, including the strategic location in the commissions to exploit any dissent among the majority and to seek to block or postpone the decisions to be made. As argued by Silveira and Silva (2014) , the executive agenda may not be imposed unilaterally on the legislature.
Referring specifically to the object of this article, it has been shown in prior studies that the main opportunity for union participation in the decisionmaking process of social security reform takes place within the legislative commissions (JARD DA SILVA and CORTEZ, 2007; JARD DA SILVA and DINIZ, 2009 ). This is because, as previously observed, the system of commissions concentrates the main opportunities for the minorities to influence change in public policies.
5
In the same study, Santos (2002) relativizes the importance of party loyalty: "In the post-88 period, however, freedom of choice of the leaders is not limited by party factions, due to the simple fact that these are not more politically relevant with respect to behavior on the floor, which explains his attention being directed primarily to the ability of a representative to produce well-informed public policy" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 252 ). e0002 -6/27
It is precisely this last aspect of the Brazilian legislative process that will be explored in the following sections, emphasizing the participation of the union bloc in the legislative process of the Proposal of Amendment to the Constitution, Article 40, from 30 April, 2003 (PEC 40/2003 .
According to Figueiredo and Limongi (1998) and to Melo and Anastasia (2006) , social security reforms are political proposals that impose immediate, concentrated costs and generate diffuse long-term benefits. Thus, they are defined as 'politically infeasible' by the academic literature 6 .
Without ignoring the full complexity of the political processes of the retrenchment of social policies, which might minimize these costs both in terms of their concentration as well as their contemporization (PIERSON, 1997) , the present study is interested in the fact that this particular feature of social security reforms favors the actions of groups opposed to changes in the status quo, which seek to increase the visibility of unpopular measures and, consequently, the political costs of reform (BÉLAND, 2001; HIROI, 2008) .
In summary, in the specific case of this study, it aims to verify the extent to which the unionist representatives exploited the particular characteristics of the The discussion of the unification of the social security system is not new and it dates back to discussions related to the Constitutional Revision of 1993.
However, although defenders are found in broad segments of society, the effective unification of the RGPS and of the RPPS never got onto the Brazilian social security reform agenda .
In fact, similar to his predecessor, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (from now on, FHC) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , the reform proposed by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 Silva ( -2010 was limited to the criteria for eligibility and the rules for granting RPPS and RGPS benefits:
It deals with moving in the direction of the convergence of rules between currently existing social security systems, applying to public servants, in any possible way, the requirements and criteria closest to those of workers in the private sector. With this approach, we seek to make Social Security more equitable, socially more just and financially and actuarially viable in the long term (BRASIL, 2003) .
The first distortion singled out by the government was the lack of a direct relationship between contributions and benefits in the social security system for public servants. Their pensions had used the final salary of the effective position as the reference; while the calculation of the benefits for workers in the private sector corresponded to the arithmetic mean of their contributions, multiplied by a socialsecurity factor 7 .
However, among the public servants and their representative bodies, the idea predominated that the social security system involved the recognition of a pró-labore facto working relationship. That is, the full pension was seen as "a de facto extension of working in the public sector and not because they contributed thereto" (GUERZONI, 1999, p. 59; PACHECO FILHO and WINCKLER, 2005) .
The concept was questioned in the academic and political debate on the subject:
In fact, this critical point largely dates back to the promulgation of the Federal Constitution because, prior to the institution of the Regime Jurídico Único dos Servidores Públicos Civis da União -RJU (Single Legal System of Public Servants of the Union), as well as of the states and municipalities, the public workers who were already held in statutory status, contributed only to the pensions that were to be paid to their spouses and dependents (and not to their own pensions) (BRASIL, 2003, p.09) .
The second distortion is in regard to the lack of a salary cap for public employees. While workers in the private sector were limited to the RGPS cap, in the public sector there was no salary cap for benefits. According to the government, this situation promoted a large inequity in the granting of social security benefits, not only between workers from the public and private sectors but among the public servants themselves working on different branches (executive, judicial and legislative).
The social security reform proposal of Lula's government also identified distortions in regard to the death benefit. In the public system, the benefit corresponded to 100% (one hundred per cent) of the salary of active workers or 100% of the benefit of inactive workers, with no maximum limit. For workers in the private sector, though, the same benefit was calculated by the mean of the contributions of the active workers or 100% of the benefits of the inactive workers, both limited to the RGPS ceiling.
In terms of social equity, the differences in the criteria for granting benefits offered by the RPPS and the RGPS were shown by the government as a redistribution of income from workers in the private sector to workers in the public sector:
Under the current rules, a regressive situation can be seen according to which public servants who, notoriously, have a higher average income than that of workers in the private sector, end up being rewarded with the granting of benefits without the necessary contributions, an authentic distribution of income in reverse, wherein the poorest collaborate to sustain the benefits of the richest (BRASIL, 2003, p. 12). In general terms, the social security reform of Lula's government may be classified into two large blocs: 1) measures for bringing the rules of the RPPS closer to the norms of the RGPS; and, 2) corrective measures for the inequalities of the RPPS. It is not possible to draw a firm line between these two groups of Sidney Jard da Silva (2016) 10 (2) e0002 -9/27
measures, but the proposed classification allows clearer visualization of the meaning of each group of changes: Among the steps for bringing the rules of the systems of public servants closer to the precepts of the social security system for private sector workers, the following stand out: 1) change in the basis for calculating pensions; 2) change in the calculation of readjustment of benefits; 3) establishment of a ceiling for social security benefits; 4) raising the RGPS ceiling.
Among the specific adjustments to the RPPS rules, the following stand out: 1) to reduce the entire anticipated pension (5% of the benefit value for each year of retirement before the minimum age); 2) to set a ceiling for the pension benefit;
3) to end the early proportional pension; and 4) to set a contribution by public retirees.
The emphasis on the inequity between the public and private social security systems shows the first large rupture in Lula's government with an important part of the constituency of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) (Workers' Party) and the union base of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) (Central Workers' Union). During the two terms of FHC's government, with the support of the PT and the CUT, the public servants were the main protagonists of the resistance to social security reform .
In addition to Lula himself, the main leader of the opposition at the time, important authorities from the executive and legislative branches, originating from The increased political cost of the break with an important sector of their base of union representation was felt by the directors of the CUT:
Why was the Minister of Social Security not from the PMDB? If this was to be corrected, the burden should have been put on the shoulders of the PMDB, which was the largest party of the allied base and which was responsible for all the damage caused to social security: you will correct the damage that you did in the past! But the burden was put on the shoulders of a militant [Ricardo Berzoini], of a disciplined militant who defended the project in general, and who had to face the consequences. That is what I am saying: we are smart to attack, but sometimes we are not so smart to defend ourselves. Why does the Minister of Social Security need to be a union director? (CAVALCANTE, 2013, Interview) .
However, Melo and Anastasia (2006) Also, according to the same authors, the change of position of the main leaders of PT and CUT in relation to social security reform would have isolated the public servants in the decision-making process of social security policy.
Lula, on the contrary, focused on how to reform the public social security, thus isolating public servants, who had already lost an old ally -the PT itself -and drawing national labor confederations to his side, in the fight against 'privileges' and in favor of equity. Hence while Cardoso united several attentive publics against his proposal, Lula sought to divide them (MELO and ANASTASIA, 2006, p. 11). Effectively, once in the office of the Presidency of the Republic, Lula used the closeness of the rules of the social security systems as one of the main arguments in favor of reform, placing the 'privileges' of the RPPS against the 'rights' of the RGPS. In other words, he exploited the differences between the interests of the public and private sector workers that formerly, under the leadership of his own party (PT) and of his political arm in the union movement (CUT), together resisted the social security reform of FHC's government.
Unionism and the decision-making process
A few months before the election, facing the clearly worsening financial crisis of the country, then-candidate for the Presidency of the Republic Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva revealed, in a meeting of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), his 'Letter to the Brazilian People' 9 . In that letter, the future president committed himself to not promoting sudden and unilateral changes, to respecting the contracts and external obligations, to preserving the budget surplus, to promoting fiscal balance and to controlling public finances (LULA DA SILVA, 2002).
Its popular appeal notwithstanding, the main targets of the letter were the national and international financial markets. In it, the structuring of a tenuous balance of the class coalitions involving sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, the organized working class, the financial bourgeoisie and the Brazilian middle class was begun (SINGER, 2009; 2015) 10 .
The promotion of the structural reforms was an integral part of the commitment to a "new social contract" for Brazil (LULA DA SILVA, 2002). The social security reform was the first of the reforms announced in the inaugural speech of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on January 1, 2003.
9 As recorded by Machado (2007) : "The 'Letter' was read by Lula during the opening of the 'National Conference: Government Program', when leaders and PT activists and representatives of society were gathered in a hotel in São Paulo, whether or not they were supporters of the candidate's proposals" (MACHADO, 2007, p. 97) . 10 For an interesting critique of the argument of Lula's electoral realignment, see Boito Jr. (2013) . The absolute majority of unionist representatives and senators integrated the parliamentary base of the government (see Table 2 ). There were 44 unionist representatives in the House of Representatives from PT, seven from PCdoB, one from PDT, one from PPS, one from PPB and one from PFL. In the federal Senate, all five senators were from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party). Adding up the union representatives (deputies and senators) from the PT, PC do B and PDT, it can be seen that 95% of the union bloc belonged to the governing coalition 13 . In the Committee on Constitution and Justice and Citizenship (CCJC), the governing coalition had 36 parliamentarians (63.16%) among the 57 that made up the commission. Of these, only one was a member of the union bloc, representative Luiz Carlos da Silva, Professor Luizinho (PT-SP). In the vote on the constitutionality of the matter, the project was approved by 44 representatives (77%) and rejected by 13 (23%) (see Table 03 ). This was a first sign that the executive could count on the opposition sectors to offset any dissent in its support base.
12 "The Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar -DIAP, founded in 1983, advises the union movement in its actions together with the branches of government, especially in the Congress" (SANTOS, 2007) . 13 Of these, only two were originally from the Força Sindical [Union Strength] (FS), all the others were linked to the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT). Conversely, among the 13 votes favorable to public servants, there were none from any PT representative. The only unionist representative in the commission, Prof.
Luizinho (PT-SP), was loyal to party orientation and voted for the constitutionality of the matter. It was the first indication of how the union bloc would behave during the legislative process of the reform.
In the Special Committee on Social Security (CESP) (see Table 3 15 It should be observed that the PPB kept the same pattern of parliamentary action showed at the beginning of the legislative process of social security reform of the President Fenando Henrique Cardoso, that is, to position themselves formally as an independent party, but vote according to the orientation of the government (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1998; . 16 It is worth remembering that in FHC's government the presidency and the rapporteur of the first CESP were given to two critics of the Executive's proposal, representatives Euler Ribeiro (PMDB-AM) and Jair Soares (PFL-RS), facilitating the obstruction of the matter by the opposition and forcing the Chamber President, Luis Eduardo Magalhães (PFL-BA), to dissolve the Commission (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1998; MELO, 2002) .
The five CESP unionist representatives (four from PT and one from PC do B) followed the government's guidance and voted in favor of the project. Once again, in the governing coalition, the party coalition was ahead of the corporate interests of the union base. Even representative Jandira Feghali (PC do B-RJ), known as a fierce advocate of public servants, voted with the government 17 . During FHC's government, with the support of the public servants, the workers party representatives played an important role in exploiting the weaknesses of the governing coalition and postponing the legislative process of the social security reform (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1998; JARD DA SILVA and CORTEZ, 2007) . In Lula's government, however, the PT, in addition to favoring reform, had the support of former adversaries, supporters of deeper changes in the social security program of public servants, as was the case with the representatives of the PSDB and PFL.
This change in the institutional political context was also observed by important former leadership of the Workers Party:
At the time that I was the leader of the opposition to Fernando Henrique, Fernando Henrique's leader was Romero Jucá, who became the leader of Lula's government. And the leader of Lula's government in the entire National Congress was Senator Roseana Sarney. ... no wonder the PSDB bloc voted mostly with Lula's government in social security reform (HELENA, 2013, Interview) .
In fact, the government not only had the disciplined support of its base, but it also had the opposition votes. Notably, it had the support of the representatives from PSDB and PFL from states where these parties were in power and that, therefore, had direct interest in extending the measures adopted in the federal employees' system to state social security systems (NAKAHODO and SAVOIA, 2008) . instances of the legislative process. On average, over the course of the decisionmaking process, the government got 72% of the votes to approve the social security reform project, more than the minimum required (60%) for the approval of constitutional amendments. (2016) 10 (2) e0002 -18/27
Unionism, the Decision-Making Process and Social Security Reform in Brazil
As occurred in the legislative committees, in the plenary of the House and the Senate, the government counted on the disciplined vote of the union bloc in favor of the social security reform project. On average, 80% of the unionist representatives voted in favor of the executive proposal. At this point, we must say that at the key moments of the voting, in the second round in both Houses, the loyalty of the union bloc overcame that of the allied base itself, in which it was included (see Table 04 ). Throughout the legislative process of social security reform, the government had, on average, 72.6% of the votes of the representatives in the plenary session of the House and the Senate. In the first and second rounds in the Senate, the government had its best (85.2%) and its most difficult victories (63.0%), respectively. The governing coalition held together in the voting, averaging 82.0% of votes in favor. The union bloc, in turn, was equally faithful to government guidance with favorable voting averaging 81.5%.
The expected resistance of unionist representatives, pressured by the public servant representative bodies and by social movements against the reform, did not take place. The party orientation weighed more than the corporate pressure on the decision of unionist representatives. In other words, between the specific interests of an important sector of Brazilian unionism and the orientation of the party leadership, the latter prevailed.
This detachment of unionist representatives in relation to their union base, was also noticed by CUT union leaders:
Representatives from the union movement do not entirely follow the ideas of the union base. Much to the contrary, they are disciplined and their activities in the Congress will only and exclusively be guided and directed by the bloc's decisions […] . They go up to a limit: they follow, strengthen, go to demonstrations, call the offices, make visits, make petitions; but, when the bloc leader organizes and gives the guidelines, then the action is of the party (DINIZ, 2013, Interview) .
In the first-round vote on the social security reform, of the 50 unionist representatives present, only 04 voted against and 05 abstained. The few dissenting votes (against and abstentions) came mainly from representatives who had their professional careers linked to workers in the public sector (public servants and workers of state-owned enterprises): 03 physicians, 03 professors, 01 public servant, 01 telephone employee and 01 employee from the electrical sector. However, even in the broad category of 'public sector workers' the government was victorious in having the support of 17 of the 26 union representatives (65%).
The government reached a similar result in the second-round vote. The same representatives that had voted against or abstained in the first-round vote repeated their votes in the second round. So, the government once again had the majority of the votes (65%) from the public sector union bloc.
In the Senate, the situation encoutered by the executive was even calmer. Regarding the controversy over the contribution from retirees, the executive agreed to increase the exemption limit from R$1,200.00 to R$1,440.00.
In relation to pensions, he agreed to decrease the reducer index from 50% to 30% for benefits in excess of R$2,400.00. Finally, the minimum amount of time in a position required for full retirement of public servants was reduced from ten to five years.
On the other hand, the goverment promoted deep modifications in the RPPS, including: 1) definition of the minimum requirements for obtaining full retirement; 2) end of the full pension and establishment of a R$2,400.00 ceiling for retirement benefits of new public servants; 3) maintenance of the parity between active workers and retirees only for those who obtained full retirement and 18 In the Chamber of Deputies, the same PEC received the number 227/04.
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(2016) 10 (2) e0002 -21/27 differentiation of benefit raises for future workers; 4) end of proportional retirement and implementation of a reducer index of 05% a year for those who retire before the minimum age; 5) collection of a contribution from retirees and pensioners; 6) 30% discount in the amount of pensions; 7) definition of the highest remuneration of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) as salary cap for the federal public service (FLEURY and ALVES, 2004; MELO and ANASTASIA, 2006; NAKAHODO and SAVOIA, 2008) .
The data analyzed in this study corroborate the thesis of party dominance even in the processing of legislative proposals that negatively affect interest groups with parliamentary representation (ARRETCHE, 2012; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2001) . The result of the vote and the content of the approved reform indicate that, even among the representatives and senators linked to professional categories of the public sector, party bloc orientation prevailed at the expense of the specific demands of the public servants.
In short, the social security reform of Lula's government fostered important changes in the system specific to the public servants. Many of these changes were a resumption of the reformist agenda of FHC's government, which suffered, at the time, great resistance from the opposition parties -PT, PDT and PC do B -and the main Brazilian unions -CUT, FS and CGT.
Nevertheless, the bloc of unionist representatives voted in a disciplined way in favor of the proposal of the executive, following the guidance of the party leadership. Paradoxically, they had former political opponents on their side -from PSDB and PFL -that were once unable to get the union support for their social security reform bill.
Conclusions
In situations in which unionist representatives support the ruling party, does the union bloc tend to defend the specific interests of its representation base or to follow the guidance of the party coalition of which it is part? This was the fundamental question raised at the beginning of this study.
Regarding this issue, there are at least two possible reactions: 1) the representatives elected with the support of the unions oppose initiatives that involve losses to their electoral stronghold; 2) unionist representatives follow party orientation to the detriment of the demands of their representation base.
At its core, the issue that guided this study refers to the relations involved between the Executive and Legislative branches in a process of change of the public policies in which a coalition government imposes losses on specific sectors of the union base (MURILLO, 2001 (MURILLO, , 2000 (MURILLO, , 1997 , notably the active workers and retirees from the public sector.
The issue was addressed here based on the analysis of the participation of In Brazil, the Executive, by party majority, has at its disposal several institutional political instruments to overcome the resistance of minorities within the legislative committees (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1998; RICCI and LEMOS, 2004; SANTOS, 2002) . This fact limits the range of strategies available to representatives to oppose the processes of change in public policies. The 'contextual change' was the main asset of Lula's government in the social security reform (MELO and ANASTASIA, 2006) . The leftist parties that, when they were in the opposition, rejected the social security reform, once in government, came to support it. The opposition, in turn, whether for political cohesiveness or pragmatic interests regarding the financial stability of the subnational social security programs in states and municipalities where they ruled, also endorsed the federal government project (FLEURY and ALVES, 2004; NAKAHODO and SAVOIA, 2008) .
In summary, the data presented in this article corroborate the thesis of party discipline, even in situations in which losses are imposed on organized interest groups, such as the case of the public servants. Between the pressure of the base against the reform and the pro-reform government orientation, the absolute majority of unionist representatives, including those originally from the public sector, followed the party guidance and voted with the government. the results found in this study, one expects to identify the same pattern of behavior of the union bloc in relation to the demands of its social base and the guidelines of the party coalition of which it is part, i.e. the prevalence of the latter.
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